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Abstract 
 
 
 
Although deterrence within international relations is one of the most important research fields, 
empirical research towards it encounters many difficulties and a debate arising from it therefore is 
not surprising. This thesis aims at clarifying a debate that revolves around empirically classifying and 
coding cases of extended-immediate deterrence, which is a combination of deterrence aimed at 
preventing an attack on a third country (Danilovic, 2002, p. 52), and deterrence at its most ‘serious’ 
level, after two (or more) countries have (elaborately) threatened each other (Morgan, 1983, p. 28). 
At stake because of the debate is the reliability of existing- and the feasibility of new statistical 
research regarding the phenomenon. For explaining the different positions within the debate, the 
operationalization of key case-selection and coding criteria proves critical.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Within international relations, deterrence is both a strategy aimed at preventing an opponent from 
taking undesired military action by threatening to harm him seriously if he does undertake it 
(Morgan, 2003, p. 1-2), as well as a theory aimed at uncovering the conditions and actions enhancing 
its success. Although deterrence especially gained prominence as a strategy and theory during the 
Cold War, Lebow traces its use back to the Peloponnesian War which occurred from 431 to 404 BC 
(2011, p. 163). Nevertheless, after the arrival of nuclear weapons and the onset of the Cold War, 
deterrence evolved from an “occasional stratagem” within international relations into a 
comprehensive strategy as nuclear weapons raised the possible costs of conflict to greater heights 
than ever before (Morgan, 2003, p. 3). 
Deterrence theory is considered to have developed itself along four waves (Lupovici, 2010, p. 
705; Knopf, 2010, p. 1). The first wave started shortly after the Second World War and although its 
adherents were quick to recognize the consequences of the arrival of nuclear weapons, they failed to 
acquire following as their insights were not yet valued for (wider) use (Jervis, 1979, p. 291). During 
the second wave however, which started in the late 1950’s and in which game-theory and most 
notably the game-of-Chicken became incorporated, the theory gained prominence (Lupovici, 2010, p. 
706). Through the use of the game-of-Chicken, in which two players both have a dominant strategy 
of escalation based on the assumption that the other will bail, many tactics that contradicted 
common sense namely became clear as well as the inherent contradictory nature of the practice of 
deterrence itself (Jervis, 1979, p. 292). Starting from this wave the theory however would also start 
to receive criticism, which expanded in the third wave. The third wave started in the 1970’s (Jervis, 
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1979, p. 289), and one of the main points of critique the theory would receive in this wave was its 
mainly deductive nature, as many of its propositions were not based upon empirical research (Jervis, 
1979, p. 301; Lupovici, 2010, p. 706-707). The empirical research that would ensue in this wave 
provided new insights into among other things the ignored role of rewards in deterrence, the 
possibility of misperception and miscalculation among statesmen, and the importance of domestic 
politics (Jervis, 1979, p. 304-312). Currently deterrence is considered to find itself in a fourth wave, 
which started after the end of the Cold War and which according to Lupovici is characterized by 
increased constructivist and interpretivist influences on the one hand, and increased attention to 
terrorism, ethnic-conflicts, and rogue-states on the other (2010, p. 705).  
Within deterrence theory, deterrence is often distinguished from compellence. Whereas 
deterrence namely involves expressing a threat in order to dissuade an opponent from changing the 
status-quo, compellence involves expressing a threat in order to persuade an opponent into changing 
the status-quo (Sechser, 2011, p. 377-378), a threat which according to Schelling (1966) furthermore 
has to be accompanied by specified demands and a deadline before which they have to be met (p. 
72). Compellence, exactly because it involves bringing about action on behalf of an adversary, often 
is believed to be more difficult to execute successfully than deterrence. People namely are assumed 
to be more reluctant to stop an action they already started, than to forgo starting the action and 
looking for a “benefit of equivalent value” elsewhere (Morgan, 2003, p. 2). This thesis will revolve 
around an issue related to deterrence. 
A widely applied distinction involving deterrence amongst deterrence theorists forwarded by 
Morgan is one between immediate and general deterrence. Whereas immediate deterrence 
according to him namely concerns “the relationship between opposing states where at least one side 
is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to 
prevent it”, general deterrence relates “to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their 
relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack” (Morgan, 1983, p. 28). 
Another widely applied distinction involving deterrence among deterrence theorists is one 
between direct and extended deterrence, whereas direct deterrence namely involves the deterrence 
practiced by a country in order to prevent an attack on itself, extended deterrence involves the 
deterrence practiced by a country in order to prevent an attack on a third country, often (called) an 
ally, a protégé or a pawn (Danilovic, 2002, p. 52).  
Based on the distinctions between immediate-, general-, direct-, and extended deterrence, Huth 
in 1988 forwarded a typology based upon a combination of each ‘recipient’ of deterrence and each 
level of its involved ‘seriousness’, which included direct-immediate-, direct-general-, extended-
immediate-, and extended-general deterrence (Quackenbush, 2010, p. 61). This thesis will revolve 
around a debate regarding empirically classifying and coding cases of extended-immediate 
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deterrence, which, partially based on the earlier descriptions of extended and immediate deterrence, 
therefore entails a situation in which: 
 
             “1. The officials in a state (which we shall call the "attacker") are considering attacking a                   
 state ("protégé") that is formally allied to or deemed important by a third state ("defender").     
 2. Key officials in the defender state realize this.  
3. Recognizing that an attack is a distinct possibility, the officials of the defender state, either     
explicitly or by movement of military forces, threaten the use of retaliatory force in an effort 
to prevent the attack” (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 498).  
 
After Huth and Russett in 1984 and 1988 namely had presented findings of studies regarding 
extended-immediate deterrence based upon a statistical analysis of a dataset incorporating fifty-four 
(supposed) cases of extended-immediate deterrence from the period of 1900 until 1980 in their first 
study and on a modified dataset including thirteen new (supposed) cases of extended-immediate 
deterrence from the same period in their second study, Lebow and Stein (1990), after a re-
examination of the cases, considered only nine of the fifty-four cases of their first study and only one 
of the thirteen new cases in their second study to be valid cases of extended-immediate deterrence 
(p. 340). They in addition also dissented greatly from Huth and Russett’s coding of the outcomes of 
the cases (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 344). Although Huth and Russett took note of Lebow and Stein’s 
critique, they retained their original judgement regarding all of their cases except for (at most) two 
(Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 493). Recalling the words of Lebow and Stein (1990), these discrepancies 
therefore reveal “alarmingly low levels of cross-study reliability” between two teams of researchers 
“classifying and coding precisely the same set of cases” (p. 340). Depending on the view where one 
agrees with, statistical research towards extended-immediate deterrence therefore either is possible 
which means that generalizable conclusions regarding what enhances its success can be retrieved, or 
(meaningful) statistical research towards extended-immediate deterrence is impossible which means 
that generalizable conclusions regarding what enhances its success cannot or only to a very limited 
extent be retrieved. What is at stake therefore is the truthfulness of much of what allegedly already 
is known about what enhances extended-immediate deterrence success that is based upon (large-N) 
statistical research, both the testing and the development of propositions and theory regarding what 
enhances its success in general, and in turn, since this is crucial information for the development of 
successful practices of extended-immediate deterrence, this is also at stake. The creation of a set of 
operational standards to determine whether a case constitutes a case of extended-immediate 
deterrence, or in other words; a settlement of the debate, however is out of the reach of this 
relatively small-scale research. What however is possible and also required as a first step towards a 
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settlement of the debate is an identification, clarification, and presentation of the exact causes of the 
discrepancies in the classification and coding of extended-immediate deterrence cases between the 
two research-teams. Identifying, clarifying, and presenting these causes therefore will be the 
objective of this research. 
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Research Design 
 
Following from the identified research-problem, which entails the significant discrepancies in the 
classification and coding of cases of extended-immediate deterrence between Huth and Russett on 
the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other, the research-question will be: What causes the 
discrepancies in the classification and coding of cases of extended-immediate deterrence between 
Huth and Russett on the one hand and Lebow and Stein on the other? For retrieving the key-causes 
of these discrepancies, first an extensive review of the literature of the two research-teams regarding 
the debate will be executed. This will allow to determine the two research-teams their positions, 
infer (likely) causes of the discrepancies, and identify and select cases that are suited for inclusion in 
the multiple-case study, which will be the research-method applied. The decision is made to execute 
a multiple case-study as first of all a qualitative in-depth analysis is required of each research-team’s 
approach and their application of it in order to precisely determine and demarcate the causes of the 
discrepancies. Secondly, even though an alternative for this could be a more extensive analysis of a 
single case, through the examination of multiple cases likely more valuable information for achieving 
the research-objective can be retrieved and the research-findings will also be more generalizable. 
Thirdly, a multiple case-study in addition also allows to investigate and present certain cases 
especially because of certain characteristics in them, and to compare a number of cases on which 
they disagree, with one (or more) cases on which they agree, which both enable a more precise 
demarcation and understanding of the key-causes of the discrepancies. 
A total of three cases will be forwarded, of which two will be cases on which they disagree, and 
one case on which they (now) just agree. The first case that is presented will aim at illustrating and 
scrutinizing many of the in the literature review identified key-causes of the discrepancies, the 
second at illustrating and scrutinizing one of these key-causes, and the third at illustrating and 
scrutinizing one crucial key-difference related to this key-cause that is responsible for much of the 
variation in their classification and coding. Combined with the second case, this case will allow for 
something that closely resembles what George and Bennett (2005) in their book ‘Case Studies and 
Theory Development in the Social Sciences’ described as ‘controlled comparison’ (p. 81). The two 
cases except for this key-difference namely are relatively similar.  
For cases to be suited for inclusion, the selection-criterium is set that each research-team at least 
to a degree that allows inferring the reasons behind its classification and/or coding must have 
elaborated on the case, as without such elaboration no certainty regarding the exact reasons behind 
their classification and/or coding exists, and based on faulty assumptions regarding them a flawed 
comparison could ensue. Concerning cases on which they after Lebow and Stein’s critique however 
agree, this criterium is modified and regarding these cases only an elaboration of Lebow and Stein 
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will be considered sufficient (although this in fact will not affect the actual cases suited), assuming 
that Huth and Russett have taken note of it. Based on these criteria, the following cases are suited 
for inclusion: 
 
Agree: 
 Germany (attacker) vs. Czechoslovakia (protégé) and Britain and France (defenders), 
1938 (case 25) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 348, 364-365; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 490 – 
endnote). 
 Italy (attacker) vs. Ethiopia (protégé) and Britain (defender), 1935 (case 23) – (Lebow & 
Stein, 1990, p. 358-360; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 492 – endnote). 
 
       Disagree:  
 
 Soviet Union (attacker) vs. Turkey (protégé) and United States (defender), 1947 (case 
31) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 357-358; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 468 – endnote). 
 Turkey (attacker) vs. Cyprus (protégé) and Greece (defender), 1964 (case 44) – (Lebow 
& Stein, 1990, p. 348, 361-362; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 474-475). 
 North Vietnam (attacker) vs. South Vietnam (protégé) and United States (defender), 
1964/1965 (case 45) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 346, 362-363; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 
485).  
 Soviet Union (attacker) vs. West Berlin and West Germany (protégés) and United 
States (defender), 1948-1949 (case 32) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 368-369; Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 484-485).  
 Colombia (attacker), Panama (protégé), United States (defender), 1903-1904 (case 1 
(1988-appendix)) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 352; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 476).  
 China (attacker), Taiwan (and the off-shore islands in 1954-1955, 1958) (protégé), 
United States (defender), 1950; 1954-1955; 1958 (case 7 (1988-appendix); case 34; case 
37) – (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 353-354; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 485-487). 
 
Regarding the cases on which they agree, the decision is made to include case 23, as this case 
according to Huth and Russett entails a “borderline case” (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 492 – endnote), 
which makes it more valuable for investigating the nature and extent of the discrepancies than the 
only alternative case in this area, as their agreement on this case is more straightforward (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 490 – endnote). Regarding the cases on which they disagree, the decision is made 
to include case 7 and case 31. Case 7 is chosen because it of the three crises revolving around Taiwan 
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(and in 1954-1955 and 1958 the off-shore islands) is the one to which most attention is devoted in 
the literature, and because it incorporates many of the key-causes of the discrepancies between 
them. Case 31 in turn is chosen because it clearly forwards one key-cause of the discrepancies 
between them, and because it combined with the case on which they agree; 23, enables to clearly 
advance one crucial key-difference related to this key-cause between each of the research-teams 
their approaches. Case 44 is not included because although it does reflects a cause of the 
discrepancies between them, it does not reflects a key-cause, and it also already is forwarded in the 
literature review. Case 45 is not included because rather than reflecting a key-cause of the 
discrepancies between them, it reflects a different assessment of the events themselves in the case; 
Huth and Russett allege that North Vietnamese troops were already stationed in South Vietnam and 
were possibly willing to fight, while Lebow and Stein did not identify/forward this – apart from this 
this agree that the US-actions (also) were aimed at compelling the the North Vietnamese into halting 
their support to the Vietcong (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 363; Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 485). Case 1 is 
not included because although it does reflects a difference between each of their approaches, this 
difference in itself does not seems key for explaining the variance in the classification of the 
research-teams. In addition, it also already is forwarded in the literature review. Finally, case 32, 
which entails the Berlin-blockade, is not included because of reasons to do with space. The case itself 
is suited for inclusion as it reflects each of the research-teams their approaches well.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
Prior to an extensive outline of the debate, which is aimed at providing a clear understanding of each 
research-team’s approach and the just forwarded case-selection, some information will be provided 
that is useful for an understanding of some key-elements discussed in the debate. Although in the 
introduction the concept of extended-immediate deterrence already was explained in order to 
provide a clear understanding of the research-problem, the debate revolves around empirically 
researching it, which requires its operationalization. Both the presence of an intention to attack on 
behalf of the attacker, as well as of a practice of deterrence on behalf of the defender, therefore 
have to be determined (Danilovic, 2001, p. 100-101; Danilovic, 2002, p. 55-56). As will become clear 
in the debate however, determining these is not straightforward. Subsequently, if these two are 
considered present, the outcome of the extended-immediate deterrence encounter has to be 
determined. Although extended-immediate deterrence failure is relatively straightforward, namely 
(often) a military attack on the protégé, the absence of such an attack does not necessarily means 
that deterrence has been successful (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 497; Huth & Russett, 1993, p. 62). 
Other factors, like a change of decision-makers, or a change in priorities by them, namely could also 
have been responsible for the ‘attacker’s’ decision to refrain (Huth & Russett, 1984, p. 497). 
 
 
The Debate 
 
Lebow and Stein’s Critique on Huth and Russett’s Classification and Coding of Cases of Extended-
Immediate Deterrence 
 
Lebow and Stein (1990) forwarded a variety of reasons for why their classification differed so 
significantly from Huth and Russett’s; in thirty-seven of the fifty-four cases of Huth and Russett’s 
1984 study and in six of the thirteen new cases in their 1988 study no “persuasive” evidence of an 
intention to attack on behalf of the proposed attacker and/or of practice of deterrence by the 
proposed defender could be found (p. 357), in four of the fifty-four cases of their 1984 study and in 
four of the thirteen new cases in their 1988 study compellence was mistaken for deterrence (p. 362), 
and in four of the fifty-four cases of their 1984 study and in two of the thirteen new cases in their 
1988 study ambiguities of evidence and the existence of multiple interpretations made confident 
classification (and coding) impossible (p. 337, 342). In combination with significant discrepancies in 
the codings of the cases as well, they therefore wondered what could cause discrepancies of this 
scale between two teams of researchers examining the exact same set of cases (p. 340, 342). 
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Although an obvious explanation for the differences in the classification of the cases according to 
them could be a different definition of what constitutes a case of extended-immediate deterrence, 
this according to them was not the case as they concurred with the definition Huth and Russett 
applied (p. 342). They however did recognize to dissent from their application of this definition to the 
cases (p. 342), and forwarded two issues in this regard they considered to be responsible for the 
significant discrepancies.  
The first was the evidence Huth and Russett required for establishing the presence of an 
intention to attack on behalf of the attacker. Whereas they namely accepted both military 
movements or redeployments and verbal threats as evidence of an intention to attack, military 
movements and redeployments according to them could be executed for a variety of reasons, while 
verbal threats could be voiced by leaders in circumstances wherein they in fact are not prepared to 
resort to the use of force (p. 342-343). For determining the presence of an intention on behalf of the 
attacker, they therefore required reference to other kinds of historical evidence (p. 342-343). 
The second was the evidence Huth and Russett required for establishing that a defender 
practiced deterrence. Even though they themselves namely had applied their own requirements in 
this area, which entailed that a defender had to “define the unacceptable behavior, make public the 
commitment to punish or restrain transgressors, demonstrate the resolve to do so, and possess at 
least rudimentary capabilities to implement the threat”, in the “most permissive” fashion, they 
nevertheless found that in thirty-two of the forty-three cases they deleted from Huth and Russett’s 
two collections either the defender made no deterrent commitment, or did not “tacitly try to deter” 
(p. 344). 
 
Lebow and Stein (1990) also dissented “strongly” of Huth and Russett’s coding of the outcomes of 
the cases (p. 344). Although different definitions of what constituted deterrence failure and success 
according to them in this area could also obviously seem responsible, this, although differences in 
this area did exist – opposed to Huth and Russett they did not link deterrence failure to an “arbitrary” 
number of battle-deaths, and required evidence that an attacker refrained from the use of force 
because of the defender’s policy of deterrence – according to them was not the case (p. 344-345). 
They therefore forwarded a number of issues that according to them were responsible for the 
discrepancies in this area.  
The first was a tendency on Huth and Russett’s behalf to “measure the acceptability of the 
outcome of a crisis or conflict to the defender rather than the success or failure of deterrence” in 
general, which according to them had as a consequence that they coded as successes some cases 
other investigators had coded as failures, for which they cited George and Smoke, who considered 
the Berlin-blockade, the Suez-crisis, and the Second Taiwan-Strait Crisis cases in point of this (p. 345).  
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The second was a tendency on behalf of Huth and Russett “to confirm the success of deterrence 
tautologically” (p. 345). Originating namely from Huth and Russett’s less strict standards for 
determining the presence of an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker, they according to them 
often inferred planned attacks without clear evidence of a “would-be” attacker’s intentions, and if 
the attack then did not occur, considered deterrence to have been successful, even though the 
attacker (could have) had no intention of attacking in the first place (p. 345).  
The third was perceived political bias on behalf of Huth and Russett, which according to them not 
only led them to overestimate deterrence success on behalf of the United States, but also to wrongly 
designate the attacker and the defender in cases containing it, the Soviet Union, China, and their 
allies (p. 345-346). Huth and Russett according to them however likely did not consciously bias, they 
according to them rather relied heavily on biased analyses that stemmed from the “height of the cold 
war” (p. 346). 
A final issue they forwarded was a lack of extensiveness on behalf of Huth and Russett regarding 
the evidence they had consulted for their assessment of the cases. For uncovering the “complexities, 
ambiguities, and interpretative problems” associated with many of their cases, a broader reading of 
the evidence according to them namely was required (p. 346). 
 
Subsequently, Lebow and Stein (1990) presented some overall findings of their research, of which 
the most relevant ones will be shortly summarized. Among the most important findings according to 
them was the “seemingly elusive and fragile nature of the success of immediate deterrence”, as from 
the ten cases of extended-immediate deterrence they had retained as valid from Huth and Russett’s 
collections, they had coded only three as successful, whereof they considered two “partial or short-
lived” (p. 348). A second finding they forwarded was that contrary to the previous finding and to the 
general consensus among deterrence theorists, their research seemed to indicate a surprisingly high 
rate of success for compellence (p. 351-352). From the eight cases of compellence they namely had 
identified, they had coded five as successful (p. 351-352). A third finding they forwarded concerned 
the distinction between compellence and deterrence. Notwithstanding their conceptual distinction 
namely, they found that in reality the two were often practiced “in tandem” and in ways that 
“effectively” blurred the distinctions between them, they namely found that deterrence “could be 
used to reinforce compellence, and compellence to deter” (p. 352). A final (relevant) finding they 
forwarded concerned the scarce nature of ‘valid’ cases of deterrence their research seemed to 
indicate. If really no more valid cases namely could be identified, there according to them could be 
no alternative but to rely upon the comparative case-study research as the primary means for testing 
the conditions under which deterrence succeeds or fails, as quantitative research then would be 
excluded (p. 350). To nevertheless however identify and code the largest number of cases possible, a 
11 
 
broad-based effort of information- and interpretation-sharing among deterrence analysts, historians 
and other experts according to them had to be developed (p. 350-351). 
 
Huth and Russett’s Rebuttal to Lebow and Stein’s Critique 
 
Later in the year of 1990 however, Huth and Russett (1990) provided an extensive rebuttal to Lebow 
and Stein’s critique and provided points of critique on their examination of the cases as well. What 
they considered to be responsible for most of the discrepancies in the classification and coding 
between them and Lebow and Stein was their presentation of “distinctly” different theoretical 
concepts under the same verbal label, and especially a number of inappropriate operational rules for 
selecting and identifying cases on behalf of them (p. 468). They stated that if they would take into 
account the additional historical evidence provided by Lebow and Stein, they would have coded no 
more than two cases differently, and that even if they would accept their recodings of the cases, 
their “substantive and statistical” research-findings would remain “fundamentally unchanged” (p. 
468). They subsequently elaborated on what they considered to be inappropriate operational rules 
for selecting and identifying on behalf of Lebow and Stein.  
Lebow and Stein according to them first of all confused different types of deterrence when 
selecting cases for empirical analysis. Four different types of deterrence according to them namely 
could be distinguished; the sanction threatened by state A namely could either be military or non-
military in nature, and the action of state B could also either be military or non-military in nature (p. 
473). Lebow and Stein by for example using the 1964 Cyprus-crisis for criticising them because they 
had omitted it in their 1988 study and recoding it as a deterrence success of the United States 
however made clear to fail to make this distinction. The United States in the crisis namely did not 
attempt to deter a Turkish intervention by threatening military retaliation, but by threatening a 
suspension of military aid (p. 474). These cases according to Huth and Russett therefore distorted the 
dataset, as they were not suited to test when military deterrence succeeds or fails (p. 474). 
The second issue Huth and Russett forwarded concerned Lebow and Stein’s reclassification of 
some cases from deterrence to compellence, while the policies of the attacker in these cases either 
did not amount to compellence, or involved both compellence and deterrence (p. 475-476). As an 
example of the first they cited Lebow and Stein’s proposition that the United States in 1903-1904 
sought to compel Colombia into recognizing Panama’s independence. Even though the United States 
according to them namely “undoubtedly” wanted Colombia to recognize Panama’s independence, 
there according to them was no attempt by the United States to coerce it by threatening and/or 
applying military force or other types of sanctions until it would recognize Panama’s independence, 
which according to them was required to consider it a case of compellence (p. 476). Nevertheless, a 
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to broad definition of compellence on behalf of Lebow and Stein according to them however did help 
to explain their finding that compellence – “otherwise so contrary to theory and conventional 
wisdom” – was more successful than deterrence (p. 477). As an example of the second they 
forwarded the 1906 Turkish-British dispute over the establishment of the Turkish-Egyptian border. 
Britain by 1) threatening Turkey to apply direct military action if Turkish forces clashed with Egyptian 
forces or attempted to occupy all of the concerned disputed territory, and 2) drawing an ultimatum 
for the Turkish forces to withdraw, namely made use of both a policy of deterrence as of 
compellence, and Lebow and Stein’s exclusion of the case based on the grounds that it was 
compellence consequently was unnecessary, as such cases – as long as the analyst filtered out the 
right elements – according to Huth and Russett could validly be used to test deterrence (p. 475-476). 
The third issue Huth and Russett forwarded concerned the evidence Lebow and Stein required 
for establishing the presence of an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker. Even though Lebow 
and Stein’s requirement that a potential attacker had to ‘seriously’ consider force according to them 
was rather vague, if it meant what they believed it did; that an attacker had to be “resolved to use 
force from the outset of the dispute”, this according to them would result in the exclusion of a large 
number of cases wherein deterrence nevertheless was still active (p. 478). An attacker according to 
them namely 1) could be uncertain about his own intentions and could therefore probe in order to 
test the defender’s resolve, 2) could change in intentions or in his formulation thereof during the 
course of a crisis, and 3) could deceive his opponent regarding his true intentions (p. 478-480). 
Lebow and Stein’s requirement of documentary evidence of a ‘serious’ intention to use force on 
behalf of the attacker according to them therefore inevitably biased towards deterrence failures, 
which according to them however did again help to explain their finding that deterrence succeeded 
in only three cases (p. 480). 
 
Huth and Russett (1990) subsequently elaborated on how they themselves had operationalized the 
criteria for identifying and selecting cases of extended-immediate deterrence. What determining the 
presence of an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker was concerned, they considered both 
implicit and clear verbal threats (p. 482), as well as the “movement, buildup, and/or positioning of 
military forces near or along the border or coastline of the protege” valid indicators (p. 483). As they, 
like Lebow and Stein seemed to require, in their research had found acquiring (confirming) 
documentary evidence of an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker problematic, they had 
decided to follow the “very different procedure” of first documenting verbal threats and/or military 
actions, to then search for evidence of alternative reasons for why the verbal threats and/or military 
actions could have been executed (p. 483). If subsequently no strong evidence for an alternative 
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reason could be found, they considered an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker to be present 
(p. 483). 
For determining a defender’s practice of deterrence, they also considered both verbal threats or 
military actions valid indicators (p. 488). For the execution of a “proper” empirical test however a 
variety of “intensity and forcefulness” in the practices of deterrence among the ‘defenders’ 
according to them was required, because deterrence theory according to them predicted that the 
probability of deterrence success depended “in part, on precisely these differences in the policies of 
the defender” (p. 489). As long as the potential defender therefore issued “at least one verbal 
warning or initiated a show of force near the border or off the coast of the potential attacker”, they 
considered a practice of deterrence to be present (p. 489).  
Concerning the critique on their coding of the outcomes of the cases, they defended their linkage 
of deterrence failure to 200-250 battle-deaths, as this among other things would prevent the 
inclusion of cases wherein the violence erupted accidentally (p. 490). What the coding of a 
deterrence case as successful was concerned, they similarly to their earlier approaches considered 
the defender’s practice of deterrence to be central in an attacker’s decision to refrain from attacking, 
unless evidence for alternative reasons could be found (p. 491). Acquiring like Lebow and Stein 
seemed to require documentary evidence of an attacker proving that he refrained from the use of 
force because of the defender’s practice of deterrence according to them was impracticable (p. 491). 
A final issue concerning their coding they (earlier) addressed was their alleged political bias 
according to Lebow and Stein. Contrary to what Lebow and Stein (in their eyes) alleged, neither did 
they assume only aggressive intentions on behalf of the Soviet Union, China, and their allies, nor did 
they fail to consider the differing perspectives of actors in a crisis. They acknowledged that 
“traditional security interests” could have been behind the Soviet Union’s policy regarding Turkey in 
1946 and Berlin in 1948, but it according to them however was not contradictorily to “believe that a 
country may be motivated by defensive concerns and still to code it as a potential attacker [emphasis 
in original]”, which Lebow and Stein perhaps did presume (p. 487).  
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Case Studies 
China (attacker) vs. Taiwan (protégé) and United States (defender), 1950. Case 7 in Lebow and 
Stein’s 1988-appendix (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 341). 
 
Huth and Russett: Deterrence success. 
Lebow and Stein: Ambiguous. 
 
Case summary: After China had seen years of civil war between forces loyal to the Guomindang 
(GMD) of the ROC government and forces loyal to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), on October 
the 1st of 1949, after significant communist territorial gains, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Chao & Myers, 2000, p. 6-7). Although officials from the United 
States as a consequence were deeply troubled, they saw no easy way to reverse the communist 
progress and US-president Truman on the January the 5th of 1950 stated that the United States 
would refrain from getting involved in the Chinese civil war as well as from supporting the 
Guomindang forces on Taiwan (Matray, 2011, p. 156). By April of 1950 the communist PLA-forces 
had managed to take control over all of the mainland except for Tibet (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990, p. 98), 
and meanwhile many (more) Guomindang sympathizers and forces fled to Taiwan, which combined 
with Hainan and other off-shore islands remained a Guomindang bulwark (Chao & Myers, 2000, p. 7-
8; Whiting, 1968, p. 20). Even though PLA-general Su Yü in February of 1950 had warned of the 
difficulties involved in capturing the islands of the Chinese southeast coast and especially Taiwan, as 
a “batch of the most intransigent reactionaries” from China’s mainland had settled there, at the end 
of April of 1950 PLA-forces managed to capture Hainan which led PLA-units tasked with “liberating 
Taiwan” to send delegations to the island to study the successful operations (Whiting, 1968, p. 21). 
After one month later the Chusan islands were also captured, the authoritative Jen Min Jeh Pao 
(People’s Daily) reported that the “last battle” left for “completing the liberation and unification” of 
China was Taiwan (Whiting, 1968, p. 21). Subsequently, in June of 1950 PLA-troop “exhortations” 
opposite to Taiwan according to Allen Whiting (1968) parallel those observed prior to the invasion of 
Hainan, and in addition information from United States intelligence reports also prompted that by 
June the communists had completed “virtually all preparations” for an invasion of Taiwan (p. 22). 
However, after North Korea on the 25th of June launched a vast offensive across the 38th parallel to 
reunite the Koreas, US-president Truman decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in 
order to ‘neutralize’ the Strait and to prevent a possible communist take-over of Taiwan (Yufan & 
Zhihai, 1990, p. 100; Truman, 1965, p. 492). Although the PRC reacted fierce, with Zhou Enlai on 
behalf of the PRC-government stating that the US military actions constituted “armed aggression 
against Chinese territory”, and Mao Zedong on the 28th of June that they were an “open exposure” of 
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the United States “its true imperialist face” (Yufan & Zhihai, 1990, p. 101), the US would maintain its 
presence in the Strait (Elleman, 2012, p. 133), and no Chinese attack ensue. 
 
Analysis of Huth and Russett’s and Lebow and Stein’s assessment: This case illustrates three key-
differences responsible for the variation in the classification and coding of extended-immediate 
deterrence cases in the approaches of Huth and Russett and Lebow and Stein. The first key-
difference is that whereas Huth and Russett considered the verbal statements and troop build-up 
and movement of the PRC/PLA opposite to Taiwan sufficient for determining that they intended to 
attack Taiwan (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 486), Lebow and Stein argue that the evidence suggests that 
there was no such intention (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 353). On the contrary, new evidence according 
to them suggests that the communist troop build-up and movements opposite to Taiwan in fact were 
deterrent in nature, as Mao Zedong (allegedly) expected a US-invasion launched from its base on 
Taiwan (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 354). A second key-difference is the different definition of 
compellence each research-team applies. An opposing view, “consistent with recent historical 
scholarship”, according to Lebow and Stein (1990) namely considers the actions of the United States 
regarding the PRC as compellence, as it intervened on behalf of the Guomindang in the Chinese civil 
war and subsequently forced an “otherwise unnatural” division of the country on the advancing PLA-
forces (p. 353). Huth and Russett on the other hand reject considering the US actions as compellence, 
as there according to them was no effort on behalf of the United States to apply military or other 
sanctions until the PRC would recognize Taiwan’s independence, and Lebow and Stein’s forwarded 
assessment of the case as compellence according to them therefore (again) reflects their to broad 
definition of compellence (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 477). A third and final key-difference is to some 
extend the consideration of-, but to a greater extend the consequences each research-team pins on 
the existence of differing perspectives and/or motivations of actors in a crisis. Lebow and Stein, as 1) 
the PRC instead of planning an offensive namely could in fact have aimed to deter, 2) the actions of 
the United States through the eyes of the PRC could have been interpreted as compellence, and 3) 
because the United States in turn did perceive its own actions as deterrent in nature (Lebow & Stein, 
1990, p. 354), prefer to refrain from classifying and coding the case. Huth and Russett however, while 
acknowledging that the PRC could have been driven by defensive motivations, do not see an obstacle 
in either designating it as the attacker nor in establishing it as a case of deterrence on behalf of the 
United States (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 486-487). 
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Soviet Union (attacker) vs. Turkey (protégé) and United States (defender), 1947 (1946). Case 31 in 
Lebow and Stein’s 1984-appendix (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 341). 
 
Huth and Russett: Deterrence success. 
Lebow and Stein: Not a deterrence encounter. 
 
Case summary: Starting in 1943, Stalin repeatedly voiced complaints regarding the Montreux Treaty 
of 1936 as the sole Turkish control of the Turkish Straits it enabled caused the Soviet Union to be 
solely dependent on Turkey’s goodwill and interpretation of the treaty regarding its dependent trade 
and security-matters (De Luca, 1977, p. 510-511). After Stalin during the Potsdam-conference in July 
of 1945 again forwarded the issue, but similarly to previous attempts again failed to reach an 
agreement with Roosevelt and Churchill (Xydis, 1960, p. 69), they agreed to settle the matter through 
forthcoming “direct conversations” between each of the three states and the Turkish government 
(De Luca, 1977, p. 512). Although both Truman (Roosevelt died) and Churchill in November of 1945 
however would follow up on this commitment by sending a proposal regarding a regime for the 
Straits to Turkey, Stalin’s proposal would only follow on the 7th of August the next year (Xydis, 1960, 
p. 88-89). Meanwhile, on March the 18th of 1946, US ambassador to Turkey Edwin C. Wilson reported 
Soviet military movements in Romania and Bulgaria as well as in northern Iran towards the Turkish 
border, which according to him could soon place the Soviet Union in a position to strike Turkey 
(FRUS, 1946, p. 818-819). In addition, the fact that the Soviet Union had not retreated its troops from 
Iran in the first place constituted a violation of an agreement between them, the US, the UK, and Iran 
(Erkan, 2010, p. 112, 126), and Soviet troops in Azerbaijan bordering Turkey were reinforced (Cossa, 
1990, p. 8). Neither military analysts from the United States nor Turkish officials however were 
particularly concerned about an impending Soviet attack (Leffler, 1985, p. 811). Later, when on 
August the 7th of 1946 Stalin finally would send his proposal regarding a regime for the Straits, this 
(reportedly) again coincided with large-scale Soviet troop movements in Bulgaria and Transcaucasia 
and naval exercises in the Black Sea (De Luca, 1977, p. 516). Nevertheless, US General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg at the time assured President Truman that no unusual Soviet troop movements, 
concentrations, or build-ups of supply were observed (Leffler, 1985, p. 811). Although in the 
following months the tug-of-war regarding the Straits’ regime would continue between the UK, the 
US, the Soviet Union and Turkey, no Soviet attack would materialize (De Luca, 1977, p. 516-520).  
 
Analysis of Huth and Russett’s and Lebow and Stein’s assessment: Lebow and Stein, similarly to in 
the previous case, contend that no attack on behalf of the attacker, in this case the Soviet Union, was 
present, neither in the “critical period” of March of 1946 which Huth and Russett later specified 
(Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 468 – endnote), nor in the subsequent “so-called” August-crisis (Lebow & 
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Stein, 1990, p. 357-358). Even though they recognized that Soviet troop movements were reported 
and persuasions occurred, they point to the fact that Soviet forces in south-eastern Europe over the 
course of 1945-1946 actually were reduced and that neither the Turkish government nor the Truman 
administration expected a Soviet attack (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 357-358). Huth and Russett on the 
other hand however maintain that Soviet threats and troop movements in the “critical period” of 
March of 1946 “were consistent with a possible intention to use force”, and they also reject Lebow 
and Stein’s reliance on Turkish and US assessments of the Soviet actions as these according to them 
are irrelevant for determining Soviet intentions (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 468 – endnote). As both 
teams however acknowledge that Soviet troop movements and threats (or persuasions) were 
reported/occurred, this case is exemplifying for each teams their approach to determining the 
presence of an intention to attack on behalf of the attacker. Whereas Lebow and Stein namely 
disregard Soviet troop movements/threats as indications of an intention to attack without additional 
documentary evidence, Huth and Russett apply a reversed method and consider this intention to be 
present based on the Soviet troop movements/threats unless evidence of the opposite is found. 
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Italy (attacker) vs. Ethiopia (protégé) and Britain (defender), 1935. Case 23 in Lebow and Stein’s 
1984-appendix (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 341). 
 
Huth and Russett: Deterrence failure. 
Lebow and Stein: Not a deterrence encounter. 
 
Case Summary: As Italy under Mussolini already controlled Eritrea and a large part of Somaliland 
which both bordered Ethiopia (Mallett, 2015, p. 70), and was eager to like France and Britain acquire 
an African empire of its own, it had set its eyes on capturing Ethiopia (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 358). 
Ethiopia however was member of the League of Nations, which meant that if it attacked Ethiopia and 
the League’s members invoked Article Sixteen it would be in a state of war with all of its members 
and could be subject to economic and/or military sanctions (Mallett, 2015, p. 67). Domestically 
Mussolini therefore was heavily advised to ascertain French and British approval prior to an invasion 
of Ethiopia, as they were not only the League’s strongest members, but also the countries with the 
largest territorial possessions in Africa already (Mallett, 2015, p. 67-68). Britain and France however 
were divided in their approach towards Italy, whereas Britain namely was determined to defend the 
League’s principles vis á vis Italy and tried to ascertain French (military) support against Italy to this 
end (Parker, 1974, p. 293-296), France, as it had stronger defensive interests in not estranging a 
potential important ally against Germany on Europe’s mainland, was more flexible towards Italy 
(Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 359). Irrespectively of French and British approval however, Mussolini 
pushed through on his invasion plans and by the early autumn of 1935 had amassed some 400,000 
troops in Italy’s East-African territories bordering Ethiopia (Mallett, 2015, p. 218). The British, as 
(what for the Italians was unknown) a precautionary measure against any rogue actions giving Italy 
an advantage (Parker, 1974, p. 306), in early September considerably reinforced their Mediterranean 
Fleet, their naval presence at Gibraltar, and send ships to the waters off the Suez Canal (Mallett, 
2015, p. 213-214). On the 11th of September British Foreign Secretary Hoare in a speech at the 
General Assembly furthermore warned Italy by stating that “the League stands, and my country 
stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for 
steady and collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression” (Parker, 1974, p. 306). Italy 
meanwhile, uncertain of the British intentions, was alarmed by the British actions and the Italian 
ambassador in London Dino Grandi spoke of an “environment wherein the recourse to force, 
excluded by the majority until just a few days ago, has become a real possibility” (Mallett, 2015, p. 
216). After conflicting messages from both the French and the British however regarding the British 
intentions, with French Prime Minister Laval first to British dissatisfaction on the 19th of September 
assuring Aloisi, Mussolini’s Chief of Cabinet, that “there had never been any question of closing Suez 
or of military sanctions”, on the 23th of September, after initial reluctance, British Foreign Secretary 
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Hoare himself decided to reassure Mussolini by messaging him that there had been “no discussion of 
closing the Suez Canal or military sanctions” (Parker, 1974, p. 307). Subsequently, assured by the 
French and the British, on the 2nd of October the Italian attack on Ethiopia began.  
 
Analysis of Huth and Russett’s and Lebow and Stein’s assessment: Lebow and Stein contend that 
this case does not constitute a case of deterrence because 1) Britain made no commitment to come 
to Ethiopia’s aid in case it was attacked, and 2) it in fact even assured Italy of this (Lebow & Stein, 
1990, p. 360). Although Huth and Russett were earlier convinced of the opposite, they after Lebow 
and Stein’s critique agree that as the actions of Britain according to them “were sufficiently weak”, as 
they constituted “only one verbal threat” (likely Hoare’s speech to the General Assembly), to drop 
the case as a deterrence encounter, although it according to them was a “borderline case” (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 492 – endnote). In addition, even though they first also were convinced that the 
British naval measures were in part meant as a deterrent-bluff against Italy, they now also agree that 
they were most likely precautionary in nature and meant to protect British naval forces (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 492 – endnote). As in this case, like in the previous case, Huth and Russett observe 
the presence of military actions and threats (although of a ‘defender’ rather than of a ‘attacker’), but 
yet agree with Lebow and Stein’s assessment of not considering it a deterrence encounter, this case 
is exemplifying in the sense that it shows the area on which they still agree with Lebow and Stein, 
namely when documentary evidence points to alternative reasons of why military actions and threats 
were executed, and from which onwards they will disagree, which makes it valuable for inclusion.  
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Reflection & Conclusion 
 
Based on the analysis of as well as the debate as the cases, which consisted of a first case that 
included many of the key-causes of the discrepancies, a second which exhibited one of these key-
causes, and a third which exemplified where the research-teams their approaches diverge, what 
becomes clear is that whereas Lebow and Stein require a near ‘perfect’ case for the analysis of a 
nevertheless hard to grasp phenomenon like deterrence, Huth and Russett prefer to allow for a 
significant degree of uncertainty when selecting cases. In the table beneath an overview is presented 
of the key-differences in their approaches that in the research are identified as being responsible for 
the significant discrepancies in the classification and coding of the extended-immediate deterrence 
cases between them. A few accompanying notes however are in place. First, although the different 
definition of compellence is presented, the different definition in itself does not seem to be 
responsible for much of the variation. This because no acts of deterrence themselves seem to have 
been coded as compellence by Lebow and Stein, rather the difference lay in a different appreciation 
of cases wherein both deterrence and compellence was practiced. Secondly, even though the 
operationalization of deterrence success according to Lebow and Stein (1990) was not responsible 
for much of the variation in the coding (p. 344), it is included because it is exemplifying for much of 
each research-team’s approach. Thirdly, although the same counts for the consequences each team 
pins on the existence of multiple perspectives, it for the same reason is also included. All in all, 
significantly different evidential requirements regarding the key case-selection and coding criteria 
are key for explaining the discrepancies.  
 
                Huth & Russett                  Lebow & Stein 
Classification   
Establishment of an 
Attacker’s Intention 
to Attack 
Intention to attack on behalf of the 
attacker is assumed to be present 
based on verbal threats and military 
actions. Only if evidence is found of 
the opposite the presence of an 
intention to attack on behalf of the 
attacker is disregarded (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 483). 
Intention to attack on behalf of the 
attacker is not assumed to be present 
based on verbal threats and military 
actions. Additional historical evidence is 
required to establish an attacker’s 
intention to attack (Lebow & Stein, 
1990, p. 342-343). 
Establishment of a 
Defender’s Practice 
of Deterrence 
A defender needs to have issued at 
least one verbal threat or have 
initiated a show of force near the 
potential attacker’s border or off his 
coast in order to consider a practice of 
A defender “must define the 
unacceptable behavior, make public the 
commitment to punish or restrain 
transgressors, demonstrate the resolve 
to do so, and possess at least 
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deterrence on behalf of the defender 
to be present (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 
489). 
rudimentary capabilities to implement 
the threat” in order to consider a 
practice of deterrence on behalf of the 
defender to be present (Lebow & Stein, 
1990, p. 344). 
Definition of 
Compellence 
Compellence constitutes a situation in 
which the policymakers in state A 
through threats and/or military 
sanctions attempt to force the 
policymakers in state B to comply with 
their demands before a clearly set 
deadline (Huth & Russett, 1990, p. 
475).  
Compellence constitutes a situation in 
which the threats made are aimed at 
stopping an adversary from an action it 
has already started or to have it start an 
action that it would otherwise not have 
started (Lebow & Stein, 1990, p. 344). 
Coding   
Operationalization 
of Extended-
Immediate 
Deterrence Success 
If an attacker decides to refrain from 
attacking, the defender’s practice of 
deterrence is assumed to be 
responsible unless evidence of the 
opposite is found (Huth & Russett, 
1990, p. 491). 
If an attacker decides to refrain from 
attacking, evidence of him doing so 
because of the defender’s practice of 
deterrence is required (Lebow & Stein, 
1990, p. 344-345). 
Consequences of 
Competing 
Perspectives 
The existence of multiple differing 
perspectives of actors in a crisis 
regarding who is an attacker and 
defender does not obstruct role-
designation; a country can be labelled 
an attacker even though it is (partially) 
defensively motivated (Huth & 
Russett, 1990, p. 487). 
The existence of multiple differing 
perspectives of actors in the crisis 
regarding who is an attacker and 
defender obstructs role-designation; 
either multiple classifications or a 
partisan analysis (Lebow & Stein, 1990, 
p. 354-355). 
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